PROSECUTION LACHES AS A DEFENSE TO INFRINGEMENT:
JUST IN CASE THERE ARE ANY MORE SUBMARINES UNDER
WATER
GREGORY F. SUTTHIWAN

Abstract
The comment examines prosecution history laches as an infringement
defense in the context of the pending litigation against the Jerome
Lemelson Medical Education & Research Foundation.
Jerome
Lemelson amassed over five hundred patents during his lifetime. Of
these, a few key patents have priority based on initial disclosures over
forty years ago. Through multiple continuances however, the patents
were not issued until decades later and are thus currently enforceable.
Lemelson's foundation has been aggressively seeking royalties based
on these, so called "submarine patents," against bar-code technology
users. This comment discusses the problems posed by "submarine
patents" and proposes guidelines for the application of prosecution
history laches as a defense against their infringement.
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The importance in working out the purpose of Congress in keeping the
inventor's monopoly within the term for which the patent is granted is thus
shown to be capital. Any practice by the inventor and applicant for a patent
through which he deliberately and without excuse postpones beyond the
date of the actual invention, the beginning of the term of his monopoly, and
thus puts off the free public enjoyment of the useful invention, is an evasion
of the statute and defeats its benevolent aim.1

INTRODUCTION

In July of 1998, Jerome Lemelson's attorney, Gerald Hosier, sent letters to over
1200 companies demanding licensing fees for use of technology alleged to be covered
under Lemelson's patent portfolio. 2 Lemelson and Hosier had just favorably settled a
court battle with the big three automakers.3 This settlement, combined with the
substantial legal costs to defend an infringement claim, 4 caused hundreds of
companies to accept the licensing arrangements. 5 Hosier was signing approximately
one license per day, 6 garnering hundreds of millions for his client over the next few
7
years.
* J.D. Candidate, December 2003, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois; B.S.
Chemical Engineering, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 2000. The author would like to
thank Ted Field, Karl Maersch, and Mark Scott for their editorial assistance. The author dedicates
this comment to Sallie A. Sutthiwan, his mother, for her unwavering support.
I Woodbridge v. United States, 263 U.S. 50, 56 (1923) (emphasizing Congressional intent that
an inventor obtain only a "limited" monopoly). The court, upon finding that the inventor had
deliberately caused the PTO to delay the issuance of his patent for nine years for the purpose of
causing the term of the patent monopoly to coincide with the period resulting in a maximization of
his commercial profit, held that the inventor's patent was unenforceable. Id. The Patent Clause of
the U.S. Constitution, art. 1, § 8, cl. 8, has been interpreted to be both a grant of power and a
limitation on the ability of Congress to grant monopolies. Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 645,
691 (1846).
2 Nicholas

Varchaver, The PatentKing,FORTUNE, May 14, 2001, at 203, 216.
InventorEd.org, Jerome H. Lemelson, at http://www.inventored.org/inventors/Lemelson
bigthree.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2002).
Brenda Sandburg, Battling the Patent Trolls, THE RECORDER (July 31, 2001), available at
http ://www.law.com/cgi-bin/gx.cgi/AppLogic+FTContentServer?pagename=law/View&c=Article&cid=
ZZZ4DX7MSPC&live=true&cst= l&pc=0&pa=0.
5 Varchaver, supra note 2, at 216.

GId.
7 Brenda Sandburg, Inventor's Lawyer Makes a Pile From Patents, THE RECORDER (July 31,
2001), available at http://www.law.com/cgi-bin/gx.cgi/AppLogic+FTContentServer?pagename=law/
View&c=Article&cid=ZZZUS8JQSPC&live=true&cst= l&pc=0&pa=0&s=News&Explgnore=true&sho
wsummary=0. Gerald Hosier, Lemelson's attorney, declines to say how much he has actually made
from licensing Lemelson's patents. Id. However, by most accounts it is approximately $400 million.
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Many companies refused to accept the license agreements, calling the relevant
Lemelson patents "submarine patents," and arguing that because the patents relied
on initial disclosures dating back to the mid-1950's, they should not be enforceable
today.8 These companies were soon sued by Lemelson. Between 1998 and 2000,
seven suits have been filed against a total of 632 companies. 9
This Comment discusses the defense of prosecution laches in relation to the
submarine patents issue posed by the pending Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson
Medicai ° litigation. Part I begins with a background of Jerome Lemelson and his
patent activity. Part II.A explores the submarine patent-why they exist and how
they are harmful. Part II.B discusses the prosecution laches defense. Part III.A
describes the Lemelson patents at issue in the pending litigation.
Part III.B
examines the requirements for a laches defense in relation to Lemelson's prosecution
activity concerning the patents at issue. Part III.C follows by discussing the policy
considerations surrounding application of the prosecution laches defense. Part IV
then proposes a test by which courts can determine whether a patent should be
subject to a prosecution laches defense.

I. JEROME LEMELSON
A. Background
To understand why one person would have patent license agreements with
hundreds of companies and litigation pending against hundreds more, we must first
seek to understand the individual himself. Jerome Lemelson was born in Staten
Island, New York, on July 18, 1923.11 The son of a physician and a teacher, Jerry as
he was known by his family and friends, displayed an early proclivity toward
invention. 12 As a child, he constructed an illuminated tongue depressor for his father
to use in his medical practice.1 3 After serving in the Army Air Corps engineering
department during World War II, Lemelson completed his studies at New York
University, earning three engineering degrees, including master's degrees in
aeronautical and industrial engineering.14
Id. Last year, Forbes Magazine ranked him as the country's top-earning attorney with an estimated
income of $40 million. Id. The bulk of Hosier's fortune comes from a long-standing relationship
with inventor Jerome Lemelson. Id.
8

Id.

Varchaver, supra note 2, at 216. After the court denied a prosecution laches defense in the
case against the automakers, nearly 800 companies in various fields, including semiconductor,
telecommunications, and retail, have licensed Lemelson's patents. Sandburg, supra note 7.
10 277 F.3d 1361, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2002). This case was originally brought by Symbol
Technologies in March of 2000. Id. The case was consolidated with a similar action brought by
Cognex Corp. Id. On January 24, 2002, the Appellate Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on
interlocutory appeal, reversing the decision of the lower court and deciding that the infringement
defense of prosecution history laches is available. Id.
11 Martha Davidson, The Lemelson Center-About the Lemelson Center: What We Do and

Why We Do It, at http://www.si.edu/lemelson/lemelsor/jhl.html (last visited on Nov. 1, 2001).
12Id.
13 Id.

11Id.

After serving in the military Lemelson returned to New York University where he

completed his studies. Id.

Lemelson graduating in 1951 with a bachelor's degree in aeronautical
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Upon graduating, Lemelson and his brother Howard, who was also an engineer,
began researching ways to produce a substitute for stainless steel, which was in short
supply during the war. 15 They were somewhat successful in hardening steel by
infusing chromium into the metal's surface. Despite this success, they did not pursue
a patent, and the process was subsequently used in Europe. 16 Lemelson continued to
brainstorm and took meticulous care to record his ideas. 17 He had yet to file a patent
application, but was apparently planning to do S0.18 Jerome would often ask friends
and neighbors to witness and date his notebooks, of which he could fill several pages
per day.1 9 Howard would later recall how Jerome would often wake up during the
20
night and jot down ideas in one of his notebooks.

B. Patentand LitigationActivity
In 1951, Lemelson saw a demonstration of a punch-card controlled lathe at a
metal factory in Brooklyn. 21 This sparked his interest in automated industrial
machines. 22 He began developing plans for a universal robot that could, among other
things, inspect for quality control using a new technology, 23 which would later
become known as "machine vision."24 His work on this idea culminated in a 150-page
patent application that he submitted to the United States Patent & Trademark
Office ("PTO") in 1954.25
In the 1950's, there was a heightened demand for children's toys due to the postwar baby boom. 26 The toy industry was seeking new product ideas 27 and Lemelson
acted to fill that need. In 1953, Lemelson received his first patent, which was for a

engineering. Id. He went on to earn two master's degrees in aeronautical and the other in
industrial engineering, a field that encouraged creative thinking about production processes. Id.
M,Id.

16
Id.
17Id

18 Id.
19Id.
20 Id.

Dorothy Lemelson, who married Jerome in 1954, recalls how Jerome would rather

diligently record his ideas, writing on legal pads or later recording his thoughts on tape. Id. He
regularly transcribed his notes into the bound notebooks and solicited the signatures of those
around him as witnesses. Id.
21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Id.

The punch card machine seen by Lemelson was at the Arma metal factory in Brooklyn.

Id.
24 Machine Vision and Imaging Library, at http://www.visionl.com/gl.shtml (last visited Oct.
23, 2001). The term machine vision refers to the use of devices for optical non-contact sensing to
automatically receive and interpret images of real scenes, to obtain information or control machines
or processes. Id.
25,
Davidson, supra note 11. Lemelson submitted his 150-page machine vision related patent on
December 24, 1954. Id.
26 Id. It is well known among struggling inventors that the toy industry offers a good chance of
generating a quick success because the products involved are typically not very technically complex.
Varchaver, supra note 2, at 205.
27Davidson, supra note 11.
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variation of the propeller beanie toy cap. 28 Soon after, he completed his first license
9
of an invention, which was for a toy car, to the Ideal Toy Company.2
It was during this era that Lemelson first felt that a large corporation had
unlawfully appropriated one of his ideas.30 In 1954, Lemelson submitted an idea to
the Kellogg Corporation for a cardboard toy mask that could be cut out of the back of
a cereal box. 31 Kellogg declined to use his idea; however, Lemelson pursued his idea
anyway and received a patent for his particular type of mask. 32 A few years later
when he saw a similar mask printed on the back of a Kellogg's box, Lemelson
immediately sued.33 The company cited instances where it had previously printed
similar masks on cereal boxes. 34 The court dismissed the case, alleging unauthorized
use and holding that there is no cause of action where an idea claimed to be
communicated in confidence had actually already been made public by copyright or
patent. 35 However, Lemelson was convinced that the idea for his particular type of
mask was unlawfully used.36
This early court battle, among others, shaped
28

U.S. Patent No. 2,654,973 (issued Oct. 13, 1953).

Lemelson's first patent was for an

improvement to the propeller beanie novelty cap toy. See id. Lemelson's invention was a tube
leading up to the propeller that the wearer could blow into to spin the propeller. Id.
29 Davidson, supra note 11. This invention was for a wheeled toy made from moldable plastic
material. U.S. Patent No. 3,016,845 (issued Jan. 16, 1962).
30 Davidson, supra note 11. Lemelson viewed the mask printed on the back of the Kellogg's
cereal box to be a clear case of infringement. Id.
'31Lemelson v. Kellogg Co., 259 F. Supp. 904, 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Lemelson made multiple
mail solicitations to Kellogg regarding the potential use of his mask design as a promotional item.
Id. at 905. Even after Kellogg replied indicating that it had no interest in his idea, Lemelson
continued to pursue his offer. Id. at 906. An example of one such letter is as follows:
I am enclosing a photostatic copy of a drawing of my constructional masks,
which were mailed to you yesterday. The drawing shows sketches depicting
means for operating on the masks to assemble them and shape them in
accordance with the instructions included with the drawings mailed yesterday.
Please note the means of making all three masks (clown, gradpaw, [sic] and
pirate) three dimensional. The whiskers of the grandpaw [sic] mask are curled,
etc. I trust that I shall hear from you shortly.
Id. at 907.
'32Varchaver, supra note 2, at 206. Lemelson's patent was directed to a play mask having
plural components, which may be assembled and disassembled. U.S. Patent No. 2,914,772 (issued
Dec. 1, 1959). A primary object of the invention was to provide a constructional toy, which may be
worn after partial or complete assembly. Id. The mask was designed to be easy to put together and
low in cost. Id.
33 Varchaver, supra note 2, at 206. Five years after obtaining the patent for the mask,
Lemelson sued Kellogg for infringement. Id.
Kellogg cited multiple occasions where it had
imprinted masks on boxes before. Id. Lemelson brought two causes of action against Kellogg.
Lemelson v. Kellogg, 440 F.2d 986, 987 (2d. Cir. 1971). One cause of action was for unfair
competition based on alleged unlawful appropriation of his mask designs, and the other was for
infringement of a patent, which he obtained on the design in 1959. Id.
'3 Varchaver, supra note 2, at 206; see also Standard Mfg. Co., Inc. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct.
1 (1991) (holding that skepticism on the part of a competitor as to whether an idea would be
successful is an indication of the non-obviousness of a device that ultimately proves its commercial
success).
3 Kellogg, 440 F.2d at 987.
36 Davidson, supra note 11. The author cites the characteristic known as "not-invented-here"
('NIH") as the reason why companies would decline to license many of Lemelson's earlier patents.
Id. Companies would fight infringement suits in court, despite the vastly greater cost of litigation
relative to licensing in many cases. Id.
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Lemelson's world-view and undoubtedly influenced his sharp practice toward
37
corporations going forward.
Lemelson continued to invent and continued to acquire patents. 38 He also
39
attempted to develop a business based on manufacturing his patented products.
These efforts, however, were met with limited success and prompted Lemelson to
focus solely on his work as a professional inventor. 40 He was so acutely focused on
invention that, in addition to carrying his idea notebooks with him everywhere, he
41
brought his wife with him to tour the PTO on the return trip from their honeymoon.
Over the next few decades, Lemelson acquired over 500 patents. 42 Lemelson fueled
his ideas, not through hands-on tinkering, but by reading a multitude of trade
journals to which he subscribed. 43 By immersing himself in this wide range of
technical information, Lemelson was able to create his ideas as he drew connections
from one discipline to another. 44 One example of this cross disciplinary style
occurred when Lemelson read of oxidation of the skin layer of NASA's space shuttle
upon reentry into the atmosphere. 45 He applied this concept to devise a method for
46
producing semiconductor insulation for use on printed circuit boards.
Lemelson's method of invention would later draw criticism as his detractors
brought the accusation that this was not invention, but profiteering off the inventions
of others. 47 Critics, particularly those who were subject to lawsuits brought by
Lemelson, argued that he never invented the key technologies for which he had
48
patents, portraying him as an "anti-Edison."

37 Varchaver, supra note 2, at 206. Lemelson's former attorney recalls that he was surprised
by how aggressively his client wanted to pursue extraction of the maximum licensing amount from
alleged infringers. Id. at 212.
38 Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson, No. CV-N-92-613-LDG(PHA), 1995 WL 628330, at *1 (D. Nev.
June 16, 1995). Lemelson claimed to be the most prolific living inventor as of 1995. Id. He owned
patents in a wide range of industrial technologies. Id. Lemelson alleged that Ford Motor Company
infringed his patents in the area of bar coding and machine vision. Id.
'3 Davidson, supra note 11.
40 Id. Lemelson is quoted as follows:
In the beginning, I wanted to manufacture certain ideas I had in the toy and
hobby field and become financially independent. After that, I planned to get my
own lab and machine shop and develop my ideas further. I made several efforts to
get into manufacturing, and they weren't very successful. I was working on a
shoestring, and the money I had wasn't enough to carry me through.... It wasn't

until my last failure in business that I realized I should become a professional
inventor and spend most of my time at it.
Id. Lemelson also started a company called Licensing Management Corporation, with the intention
of licensing his and other people's inventions. Id. At one point, his company represented NASA's
spin-off technologies. Id. These efforts, however, were met with limited success. Id.
41Id.
42 Greg Smith, The Lemolson Situation, at http://machinevisiononline.org/public/articles/
articlesdetails.cfm?id=407 (last visited Mar. 27, 2002).
13 Varchaver, sup-ra note 2, at 204.
11 Id. at 205.
4, Lawrence D. Maloney, Lone Wolf of the Sierras, at http://www.manufacturing.net/dn/
index.asp?layout=articleWebzine&articleld=CA151329&stt=001 (last visited Mar. 29, 2002).
46 Id.
17 Varchaver, supranote 2, at 204.

48 Id.
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Another issue that complicates the contention over the validity of some of his
key patents is their lengthy prosecution times. 49 Lemelson's patent applications were
typically very long, causing them to be subdivided into groups of claims to be
evaluated independently. 50 This, combined with multiple continuances and the
cutting-edge nature of the material, resulted in several patents issuing over thirty
51
years after their initial filing date.

C. Machine Vision
One of Lemelson's earliest machine-vision-related patents was entitled
"Automatic Measurement System" and was issued on November 4, 1969.52 Claim 1 of
the patent describes electro-optical detection of variations in distances between
surfaces. 53 The patent relied on initial disclosures made in Lemelson's "universal
robot"

application

filed

in

1954. 54

Through

numerous

continuation-in-part

applications U.S. Patent No. 4,984,073 issued on January 8, 1991, also relying on
priority from these initial disclosures. 55 In the meantime, the idea of using machines
to optically sense an image field evolved into a technology called "machine vision"
56
and is now used by nearly every large manufacturer.
Machine vision is a technology by which computers compare an image taken of a
product on an assembly line, for example, to a digital file of a known standard. 57 An
argument can be made that Lemelson's early patent captured the germ of the idea for
this arrangement. 58 His critics, however, point out that Lemelson never built a
working machine vision system, and that the technology, as it is practiced today, is
vastly different from how it was conceived in the Lemelson patents. 59 Lemelson's
patents have led to an issue that is of even greater contention. That is, whether his

49 See Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson, No. CV-N-92-613-LDG(PHA), 1995 WL 628330, at *12 (D.
Nev. June 16, 1995). Several of Lemelson's patents through which he asserts rights to bar-code
technology claim a priority date over thirty years prior to when the final claims were submitted. Id.
50 Davidson, supra note 11.
51Ford, 1995 WL 628330, at *12.
52 U.S. Patent No. 3,476,481 (issued Nov. 4, 1969).
53 Id.
5 Ford, 1995 WL 628330, at *10.

Id. at *11.
5 Brief of Amici Curiae Semiconductor Industry Association et al., Symbol Techs., Inc. v.
Lemelson Med., 243 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (No. 00-1583) (citing PAUL M. SWAMIDASS, THE
MANUFACTURING INSTITUTE, TECHNOLOGY ON THE FACTORY FLOOR III: TECHNOLOGY USE AND
TRAINING IN U.S. MANUFACTURING FIRMS, at 3, 8-9 (1998)). Potential infringers of Lemelson's
patents include over two-thirds of the nation's large manufacturing companies.
Id. The
manufacturing institute conducted a study that determined the importance of bar-code technology in
a modern manufacturing environment. Id. Over two-thirds of plants with more than 100 employees
use such technology. Id.
57 Machine Vision and Imaging Library,supra note 24. The term machine vision refers to the
use of devices for optical non-contact sensing to automatically receive and interpret an image of a
real scene, in order to obtain information and/or control machines or processes. Id.
5s Varchaver, supranote 2, at 210.
5 Id.
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patents read on the ubiquitous bar-code scanner, a familiar technology that
burgeoned in the 1980's.60
When Lemelson first applied for his patents on machine vision in the 1950's, he
was focused on its use as a quality control tool for manufacturing, not for the grocery
and retail uses that are widespread today. 61 In fact, it was not even Lemelson
62
himself who first contended that his patents read on common bar-code technology.
In 1989, Lemelson's attorney, Gerald Hosier, was evaluating Lemelson's patents
when he realized that that bar-code technology is essentially machine vision. 63 In
September 1989, Hosier began amending claims to some of Lemelson's pending
64
machine vision applications to ensure that they would read on bar-code technology.
Hosier's next step was to seek licensing and royalty fees from companies in the
electronics and automotive industries, informing them that, in his assessment, they
were infringing Lemelson's patents. 65 Since many of the claims were method claims,
Lemelson was able to sue not only producers of an infringing product, but that
product's users as well. 66 A multitude of companies acquiesced, including many
European and Japanese firms, who were reluctant to engage in a costly legal

6OSandburg, supra note 7.
6' Varchaver, supranote 2, at 210.
62 Id. at 214.
63 Id.
64 Varchaver, supra note 2, at 214. Lemelson had several attorneys throughout his career. Id.
When Lemelson fist approached Hosier in the late 1980's, Hosier was one of the few patent
attorneys who specialized in the field of contingent fee patent infringement litigation. Id. Before
establishing a partnership with Raymond Niro in 1976, Hosier was a partner at a litigation boutique
in Chicago. Sandburg, supra note 4. One of the new partnership's early clients was George
Richards, the inventor of the automatic shut-off nozzle used on gas station pumps. Id. Richards did
not have the financial resources to take on the large companies that he felt were infringing his
patent, so he implored Hosier's firm to take the case on a contingency basis. Id. At that time, such
an arrangement was rare. Id. The case resulted in a successful settlement with $200,000 awarded
to the client. Id. A few years later, Hosier left to form a solo practice that focused exclusively on
contingent fee work. Id.
6 Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson, No. CV-N-92-613-LDG(PHA), 1995 WL 628330, at *13 (D. Nev.
June 16, 1995). Hosier sent letters to manufacture in which he described typically that the claims of
the current pending applications are being carefully drawn to read on practices currently in use. Id.
Hosier would later defend such statements, arguing that drafting claims to read on existing
technology is an acceptable use of the patent system. Id. In making this argument, Hosier cited
the case of State Industries,Ine. v. A.U. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In this
case the court described such practices as "commercial gamesmanship." Id. Additionally, Hosier
directed the court's attention to a quote from a previous case:
There is nothing improper, illegal or inequitable in filing a patent
application for the purpose of obtaining a right to exclude a known competitor's
product from the market; not is it in any manner improper to amend or insert
claims intended to cover a competitor's product the applicant's attorney has
learned about during the prosecution of a patent application.
Any such
amendment or insertion must comply with all statutes and regulation, of course,
but if it does, its genesis in the marketplaces is simply irrelevant and cannot of
itself evidence deceitful intent.
Kingstown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
66 HOWARD B. RocKmAN, THE PRACTICE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 8 (1998).
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confrontation. 67 However, when Hosier pursued this strategy against the big three
68
American automakers, a prolonged court battle began.
Ford, a hard-line patent litigant, argued that Lemelson's patent should not be
enforced because of his delays in the application process. 69 Ford's attorneys
contended that Lemelson's use of continuation applications during the prosecution of
his patents had been abusive.70 However, in reversing the district court's decision,
and denying Ford's motion for summary judgement, the court reasoned that so long
as delay in patent prosecution is legally permissible, an applicant cannot be punished
for taking advantage of such policy.7 1 The judge wrote, "While Lemelson's use of the
continuation process may have exploited an open area of patent practice, the court
should not intervene to regulate what Congress has not."72 The case was settled in
73
Lemelson's favor in June of 1998.
Soon thereafter, Hosier demanded and received licensing fees from hundreds of
companies in the variety of industries that use bar-code machines.7 4 Many of these
companies disagreed with Hosier's assessment of the scope of Lemelson's patents.
However, they chose settlement over costly litigation regarding a technology they
75
knew relatively little about.

67Varchaver, supranote 2, at 214.
(S Id.

6 Ford, 1995 WL 628330, at *1.
70Id,
71Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson, No. CV-N-92-613-LDG (PHA), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21497 (D.
Nev. Apr. 28, 1997). The standards for summary judgment are well recognized. Summary judgment
is only appropriate where the factual record shows that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 541 (1999).
72 Ford, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21497, at *3; see also Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport
Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 97 n.41 (1981) ("The equitable considerations advanced by
petitioner are properly addressed to Congress, not to the federal courts.").
73Varchaver, supranote 2, at 216.

74Id.
75 Id.
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Soon, companies that were paying licensing fees began to seek compensation
from the bar-code technology vendors themselves. 76
The bar-code technology
vendors, which Hosier strategically decided not to sue, have mounted a legal
campaign against the Lemelson Medical, Education & Research Foundation, the
current holder of the late inventor's patents. 77 Led by Symbol and seven other
machine vision manufactures, this coalition has set out to invalidate Lemelson's
patents on behalf of their customers. 78
This effort has garnered the expressed
support of the Semiconductor Industry Association, the Intellectual Property Owners
Association, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the National Retail
Federation.7 9 A case was filed by Cognex in district court in fall of 1999.80 Symbol
82
filed a similar action in spring of 2000.81 The trial court consolidated the cases.
Similar to Ford, Symbol and its team have accused Lemelson of unreasonable
delay during prosecution and have opined that for this reason Lemelson's patents
should not be enforceable under a laches theory.8 3 Also similar to Ford, the trial

76 Id.

77 Id.
S Id.
79 Brief of Amici Curiae Semiconductor Industry Association et al., Symbol Techs., Inc. v.
Lemelson Med., 243 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (No. 00-1583). The Semiconductor Industry
Association ("SIA") is a non-profit trade association representing the U.S. computer chip industry.
Semiconductor Industry Association Homepage, at http://www.semichips.org (last visited Nov. 3,
2001). The semiconductor industry has grown to become the nation's largest manufacturing sector
in terms of revenue. Id. The U.S. semiconductor industry has sales in excess of $90 billion
annually. Id. In an effort to continue the growth of this industry, U.S. semiconductor firms
currently invest fourteen percent of their annual sales in research and development. Id. Short
product life cycles and rapid technological obsolescence in the industry also mandate huge capital
investments in plants and equipment. Id. Because of these investments in research and capital
equipment and the importance of technological advances to its customers, the SIA has been an
advocate of effective and efficient intellectual property laws. Id. The organization's efforts helped
lead Congressional passage of the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 and to the World
Trade Organization's adoption of the Trade Related Intellectual Property Agreement in 1997. Id.
The National Association of Manufacturers ("NAM") is the largest United States based trade
organization. NationalAssociation ofManufacturersHomepage, at http://www.nam.org (last visited
Jan. 28, 2002). The NAM membership includes 10,000 businesses, eighty percent of which are small
manufacturers, and 350 member organizations. Id. NAM claims that this membership indirectly
represents over 18-million workers in the United States. Id. NAM is ranked the tenth most
powerful lobbying group in Washington by Fortunemagazine. Id.
The National Retail Federation ("NRF") is the world's largest retail trade association.
National Retail Federation Homepage, at http://www.nrf.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2001). The
NRF's membership includes leading department, specialty, independent, discount, and mass
merchandise stores. Id. Its membership also includes key suppliers to the retail industry. Id. The
Intellectual Property Owners Association (IPO') is a non-profit, tax-exempt, national organization
of nearly 100 large and mid-sized companies and 200 small businesses, universities, inventors,
authors, executives, and attorneys.
Intellectual Property Owners Association Homepago, at
http://www.ipo.org (last visited Nov. 3, 2001). The IPO was founded in 1972 and represents the
interests of owners of intellectual property as broadly as possible. Id. IPO members include
manufacturers, parties to licenses and agreements, and people generally interested in patents,
trademarks, and trade secrets. Id.
80 Cognex v. Lemelson, 67 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D. Mass. 1999).
81 Symbol Techs. Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 277 F.3d 1361, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
82 Id.
83 Id.
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judge initially ruled against this defense. 8 4 However, in a rare instance, the Federal
Circuit has decided to hear an interlocutory appeal of this decision.8 5 The three
industry trade groups, the Semiconductor Industry Association ("SIA"), the
Intellectual Property Owners Association ("IPO"), and the National Retail Federation
86
("NRF"), have filed Amicus Curiae briefs in support of a laches defense.

II. THE SUBMARINE PATENT AND THE LACHES DEFENSE
A. Submarine Patents and How They Are Harmful
When the authors of the Constitution established the right of Congress to
protect inventors, they did so by the expressed establishment of a patent system.
They authors undoubtedly saw a need to encourage invention and innovation.8 7 The
benefits of which are increased investment development of inventions and enjoyment
of the invention by the general public. The Constitution states, "Congress shall have
Power To ...

promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited

Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
88
Discoveries."
By enacting the patent laws, Congress established a social contract.8 9 An
inventor, in exchange for disclosing enabling information in his patent, is given a
limited monopoly for its use or production. Before 1900, patent applicants were
required to submit working models of their inventions. 90 Most of the 1900's, however,
saw a substantial segment of patent practice become largely separated from tangible
objects. 91 Furthermore, industry has continued to become exponentially more
specialized and complex. This has resulted in increased time and other resources
92
necessary to evaluate specialized and increasingly complex patent applications.
8 Id.
S Id. An interlocutory appeal is "an appeal of a matter which is not determinable of the
controversy, but which is necessary for a suitable adjudication of the merits." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 94 (7th ed. 1999).

Symbol, 277 F.3d at 1362.
Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson, No. CV-N-92-613-LDG(PHA), 1995 WL 628330, at *3 (D. Nev.
June 16, 1995) ("There is no doubt that one purpose of the patent laws is to reward and encourage
individual invention.").
86

87

88
89

U.S. CONST. art. I,

§

8, cl. 8.

Todd R. Miller, The Publi 's Right to Know? Or A Red-Tape Nightmare? Demanding That
Best Mode Diselosure Be Updated, 35 IDEA 261, 261 (1995) ("Patent law has been described as a
contract; however, unlike most contracts, the patent law contract is a social one.").
90 Varchaver, supranote 2, at 206.
91 Id., see also Univ. of Utah, Patent Basies: The Nature of Invention, at
http://www.tto.utah.edu/ResearchersOrInventors/patentl.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2002). The
requirement for a patent is that the invention be reduced to practice. Id. This phrase, "reduced to
practice," does not require that a working model of the invention be submitted. Id. It is sufficient
that the invention is demonstrated to work through drawings, formulas, etc. Id. When it is clear
that the product will work as described there is "constructive reduction to practice," regardless of
whether a working model was constructed. Thus, the reduction to practice requirement can be met
without actually having practiced the invention. Id.
92 Revlon, Inc. v. Carson Prods. Co., 602 F. Supp. 1071, 1082 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ('[T]he PTO is
heavily burdened and overworked ... ").
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In an environment where a technically complex patent can take several years to
process, it is not surprising that the same or very similar technologies are sometimes
developed independently while an earlier inventor's patent is being processed. As
these other inventors continue to legally develop their ideas and perhaps even bring
them to market, they are wholly unaware of the "submerged" threat within the PTO.
Should this patent gain approval, it resurfaces and the other inventor's previously
93
legal activities now become infringement. Hence the term "submarine patent."
Submarine patents may, upon a cursory analysis, seem to be a beneficial aspect
of the patent system.
That is, by rewarding the applicant who submits his
application to the patent office first, assuming there is no prior art, inventiveness
and prompt disclosure are encouraged. However, there are other factors that cause
the existence of submarine patents to be a net social harm. These factors include
unfairness, and discouragement of research and development efforts.
All are
explored in Part II.C.

B. The Laches Defense
The doctrine of laches can be summarized by the saying, "equity aids the
vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights." 94 The purpose of laches is to
promote equity by barring the prosecution of an action for relief where the party
claiming certain rights has unreasonably delayed the assertion of those rights, and
where a delayed assertion of those rights would result in prejudicial detriment to the
opposing party. 95 The laches defense is based in equity and differs from other delay
doctrines such as estoppel and fraudulent delay, in that no level of reliance or intent
96
is required.
Application of the laches defense requires that the unreasonable delay must be
caused by the party against whom the defense is invoked. 97 If the delay is the result
of a prolonged incapacitation of the prosecuting party, the defense may be
unavailable. 98 Furthermore, the delay cannot be a result of factors beyond control of
the prosecuting party.99 The doctrine also requires that the invoking party would be
materially prejudiced by a delayed exercise of the adversarial party's rights.1 00
The laches defense is usually applied under circumstances where a party has
delayed in filing a complaint.1 01 However, courts have broadened this doctrine to
include a party's conduct during patent prosecution. 10 2 The history of this extension
93 Sandburg, supra note 7.

9' Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673, 687 (1995).
9, A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1032-1033 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
96 Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson, No. CV-N-92-613-LDG(PHA), 1995 WL 628330, at *6 (D. Nev.
June 16, 1995).
97 A.C. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1032.
98 Id. at 1033.
9 Id. Some of the delays that have been recognized as beyond the control of the patentee are
poverty and illness, negotiations with the accused, wartime conditions, and dispute over ownership
of the patent. Id.
100 Id. at 1033.
101 Ford,1995 WL 628330, at *5.
102 Id.
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of the doctrine dates back to a Supreme Court case from 1923.103 In Woodbridge v.
United States, the court applied laches where an inventor delayed issuance of his
patent for over nine years.10 4 In that case, Woodbridge, the inventor, applied for a
patent on a ring-shaped cannon projectile.10 5 Under a statute in place at the time, he
10 6
sought to delay the issuance of the patent by one year, which the PTO allowed.
After the expiration of that one year, the PTO mistakenly failed to issue the
patent. 10 7 Woodbridge did not notify the PTO until he requested issuance of the
patent nine-and-a-half years later.1 08 At that time the term of a patent was fourteen
years.10 9 In applying laches and dismissing his claim, the court reasoned that
enforcing the patent after an unexplained nine year delay would be unfair to other
inventors who had obtained patents in the area, and to the government, which was
allegedly infringing the patent.110
The Supreme Court also recognized the laches defense in Webster Electric Co.
v. Splitdorf Electrical Co.111 In Webster, Kane, the inventor, filed a patent
application in 1910 for an electrical device. 112 One year before the patent issued in
1916, Kane amended nine claims of a recently issued patent. 113 Furthermore, after
the patent issued, Kane filed two additional claims in 1918.114 These two claims were
the subject of the litigation between Webster Electric and Splitdorf Electrical.1 15 In
applying laches, the Court stated that there was no reasonable explanation given for

103 Woodbridge v. United States, 263 U.S. 50, 63 (1923). In Woodhjridge, the patent applicant
was granted a delayed issuance of one year under a statute currently in force at the time. Id. at 52.
At the end of the one year, the PTO mistakenly did not issue the patent. Id. at 53. The applicant
waited nine years before notifying the PTO of its mistake and requesting issuance of the patent. Id.
The applicant gave, as the reason for his inaction, that his patent was of no financial consequence at
the time. Id. In calling his actions "designed delay," the Court held that Woodbridge had forfeited
any right he had to a patent. Id. at 61; see also Woodbury Patent Planning-Mach. Co. v. Keith, 101
U.S. 479, 484 (1880) (barring enforcement of a patent because of intentional delay of more than
sixteen years after the patent had initially been rejected and where the invention had gained
popularity).
104 Woodbridge, 263 U.S. at 63. In requesting delayed issuance of his patent, Woodbridge also
sought to amend the patent claims to read on recent developments that occurred during the period
of delay. Id. at 53. In denying his motion, the Court cited the fact that other inventors had been at
work in the same field. Id. at 56. The Court's presumption was that to deprive others who were
working on developments while Woodbridge was not pursuing his application would be inequitable.
Id.; see also Macbeth-Evens Glass Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 246 F. 695, 700 (6th Cir. 1917) (holding that
public policy dictates that an inventor cannot be allowed to delay prosecution of his patent for an
indefinite time for his own profit).
105 Woodb±ridge,263 U.S. at 51 (1923).
106 Id. at 52.
107 Id. at 53.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 58

110 Id. at 57.
111264 U.S. 463, 465 (1924). In Wobster, the Supreme Court recognized a laches defense and
barred enforcement of the inventor's patent based on his delay in prosecution. Id. at 466. In its
reasoning, the Court used the language, "simply stood by and awaited developments," to describe
the inventor's actions. Id. at 465.
112 Id. at 464.
113 Id.

H

Id.

I

Id. at 465.
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the eight-year delay between the initial application and the final amendments. 116
The court also opined that the fact that the last two claims were broader than
original claims and not very complicated in nature indicates that the last two claims
were added as an exigent afterthought rather than a logical development of the
invention.1 17 The Court concluded that the "delay was unreasonable, and, under the
circumstances shown by the record, constitutes laches, by which the petitioner lost
whatever rights it might otherwise have been entitled to."118 There have been
several appellate court decisions, which relied on these Supreme Court authorities,
recognizing a prosecution laches defense. 119

III. LEMELSON'S PATENTS, REQUIREMENTS OF THE LACHES DEFENSE, AND POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS

A. Lemelson Pa tents Related to the Symbol Litigation
The original disclosures on which Lemelson's later and currently in-force patents
rely are contained in two of his early applications. 120
On December 24, 1954,
Lemelson submitted his first application that vaguely included machine vision
claims.

121

This application was Serial No. 477,647 ('647 application").122 After two

continuations, filed in 1963 and 1966, the PTO issued Patent No. 3,476,481 entitled
123
"Automatic Measurement System."
On December 4, 1956, Lemelson filed Application Serial No. 626,211 ('211
application").124 This application resulted in U.S. Patent No. 3,081,379 entitled
"Television Inspection System," which issued on March 12, 1963.125 From these
initial two disclosures, Lemelson filed fourteen continuation and divisional
applications including the following:
1. Serial No. 267,377, a continuation-in-part application filed in March,
1963;
2. Serial No. 778,331 a continuation-in-part filed in March, 1977;
3. Serial No. 394,946 a divisional application filed in July, 1982;
4. Serial No. 411,402 a continuation-in-part application filed in September,
1989;
116 Id. at 466.
117

Id.

118

Id.

119 See Vitamin Tech., Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Fund., 146 F.2d 941, 952 (9th Cir.
1944) (finding that an eight-year delay in patent prosecution barred enforcement); see also MacbethEvens Glass Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 246 F. 695, 702 (6th Cir. 1917) (holding that public policy dictates
that an inventor cannot be allowed to delay prosecution of his patent for an indefinite time for his
own profit).
120 Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson, No. CV-N-92-613-LDG(PHA), 1995 WL 628330, at *12 (D. Nev.
June 16, 1995).
121
122

Id. at*1O.
Id.

123 Id. at *10-*12 (noting that Lemelson submitted over fourteen continuation and divisional
applications related to machine vision patents).
124 Id. at *10.
125 Id.
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Serial No. 426,080 a continuation-in-part application filed in October,
1989;
Serial No. 872,344 a continuation-in-part application filed in December,
1989.126

The applications filed in September 1989 and beyond began including claims of a
different sort. 127 For the first time, and relying on priority of the '647 and '211
applications filed over thirty-five years earlier, Lemelson's applications included
claims related to bar-code technology. 128 The patents issued as a result of these
applications are the basis of the current litigation. 129 The most recent patent
stemming from Lemelson's string of continuation applications issued in September
1994 and will be in effect until 2011, fifty-six years after the initial disclosure upon
which priority is claimed. 130 The length of this delay epitomizes the absurdity of
1 31
Lemelson's multiple continuations.

B. Requirements of the Laches Defense in Relation to
Lemelson's ProsecutionActivity
The prosecution laches defense requires that: (1) the patent applicant caused an
unreasonable delay during the prosecution process; and (2) this delay worked to the
13 2
detriment of the party invoking the defense.

1. The Delay Was Unreasonable
Lemelson seeks to attribute the multiple delays in the prosecution of his patents
to technicalities at the PTO. 133 He argues that the delay is due to the PTO's
restriction requirements on his applications and the fact that many of the patents
took several years after the filing of the last application to issue. This explains some
of the delay in obtaining a patent and is necessary considering the PTO's limited
resources and the number of applications it processes. However, this explanation
does not justify the delay between the initial disclosures in the 1954 and 1956
applications and the final amendments to these disclosures, which occurred much
later, and which are the basis for the recent litigation.
If Lemelson had been incapacitated for a prolonged period of time between his
initial and final disclosures, this delay might have been reasonable. 134 However,
there is no evidence of such incapacity. In fact he was actively patenting at that

126 Id. at *11.
127

Id. at *12.

128 Id.
129

Id.

1o30Id.
1,31 Id.
132

Id.

13 -Id.a
1,34 Id.

at * 13.
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time. 135 Because no explanation has been offered, the court can only assume that
such a long period of delay was unreasonable.

2. The Delay Is Detrimentalto the OpposingParties
The second element of the laches doctrine requires that the delay result in
prejudice to the opposing parties. 136 Symbol, Cognex, and other bar code and
machine vision related product manufacturers have asserted that their customers
are facing infringement actions brought by Lemelson. 137 Many of these customers
have agreed to pay licensing fees to avoid suit. This liability reduces the value of the
products offered by companies such as Symbol and Cognex to their customers,
because using such products will come with the additional cost of liability to
Lemelson.
Even more directly detrimental to Cognex, the machine vision
manufacturer has asserted that several of its customers have demanded
138
reimbursement from Cognex for licensing fees paid to Lemelson.

C. Policy ConsiderationsSurroundingApplication of a ProsecutionLaches Defense
There are a multitude of policy considerations that cut in favor of minimizing
the occurrence of submarine patents, such as Lemelson's machine vision patents,
wherever possible. Not the least of which is the fundamental reason for the
establishment of the patent system itself-to encourage and reward invention and
innovation.139 Submarine patents diminish this effort by creating a situation in
which an inventor or a corporation, even after thorough legal research, has no way of
knowing whether he will have the legal right to practice a technology in which he is
considering investing substantial capital and effort.
An extreme example of such potential loss of investment could occur in the
automotive and semiconductor industries, where corporations spend billions of
dollars and countless man-hours to bring new products to market. These two
industries constitute a substantial percentage of the U.S. economy and have been
subject to submarine patent infringement suits. 140 The effect submarine patents
"'s Id. at *10*12 (reciting all of Lemelson's various CIP applications).
136 A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1992).

13nSymbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 277 F.3d 1361, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
138Id.
139 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989).

"The Federal
patent system thus embodies a carefully crafted bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure
of new, useful, and non-obvious advances in technology and design in return for the exclusive right
to practice the invention for a period of years." Id. at 150-51; see also Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. (7
Pet.) 292, 304 (1833). In Shaw, an invention for the improvement of firearms was mistakenly
disclosed to the public through a relative of the inventor and subsequently used by the public. Id.
The Court held that information mistakenly disclosed to the public before the patent had been
applied for, although not authorized by the inventor, invalidated the patent. Id. at 323. "The
invention passes into the possession of innocent persons who have no knowledge of the fraud, and at
a considerable expense, perhaps, they appropriate it to their own use." Id. at 320.
140 Brief of Amici Curiae Semiconductor Industry Association et al., Symbol Techs., Inc. v.
Lemelson Med., 243 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (No. 00-1583).
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could have on the small company or individual inventor is less extreme in the
amount of investment potentially lost, but no less important qualitatively.
Individuals who develop technically complex inventions typically spend decades
doing so. Additionally, many increasingly specialized small companies may rest their
existence on the economic success of a single product or service. These entities, large
and small, should not face an environment where an unknown threat could result in
devastating loss. In such an environment, such entities would undoubtedly pare
their research and development spending to pursue more immediate, even if lesser,
results.141
Additionally, if submarine patents are enforceable, a situation is created where
142
an inventor would have an incentive to intentionally delay issuance of his patent.
For example, where an inventor anticipates that his idea will not be of great
economic significance until twenty or thirty years from now, and knowing that a
patent issued today would expire by then, the inventor could be inclined to delay
143
issuance of his patent so that it coincides with its period of greatest significance.
Furthermore, such a situation would allow initial patent filers to incorporate the
benefit of having seen the independent development work of other inventors into
their claim amendments, thus giving the patent owner broader coverage than he
should be entitled to. 144 Allowing patent applicants to delay their applications
indefinitely is also unfair to other applicants. Patent law, prior to 1995, stated that a
patent will be in effect for a period of seventeen years. 145 An applicant who delays
his issuance should not be entitled to a further reaching period of validity than one
who submits all of his claims in a timely manner.
The problems caused by submarine patents have been mitigated by adoption of
new patent rules. 146 In June 1995, as part of an effort to harmonize U.S. laws with
those of other countries, the term of a U.S. patent was changed from seventeen years
from the date of issuance to twenty years from the date of application. 147 Extensions
of up to five years were made available for patents that require a long processing
148
time, such as those in biotechnology and software fields.
This new rule, however, does not apply to patent applications filed prior to
1995.149 Therefore, the inequities caused by submarine patents have not been
See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 148.
Neil Gross & Otis Port, Suddenly DetroitHas a Huge Bill to Pay,BUSINESS WEEK (July 20,
1998), available at http://www.businessweek.com/archives/1998/b3587114.arc.htm.
143 Id.
14 Id.
145 Id.
146 Why Not GuaranteedPatent Term: Hearing on H.R. 359 Before the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995), available at http://www.ipcreators.org/congress/104cong/hearingsl04
/crillyt.htm (statement by Paul B. Crilly, Ph.D., Associate Prof. of Elec. Eng'g, Univ. of TennesseeKnoxville) [hereinafter Crilly].
'7 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
The Uruguay
Round Agreements Act amended 35 U.S.C. § 154 to change the term of a patent to 20 years
measured from the filing date of the earliest U.S. application for which benefit under 35 U.S.C. §§
120, 121, 365(c) is claimed. See id.
14 MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINATION AND PROCEDURE (MPEP) § 2710, at 2700-3 (8th ed.
2001).
149 See id. (providing that utility and plant patent applications that are filed on or after June 8,
141

142

1995 but prior to May 29, 2000 are eligible for patent term extension provisions under old 35 U.S.C.
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entirely eliminated. Many patents pending prior to 1995 will still issue. In fact,
leading up to the change of the rule in 1995, there was a substantial surge in the
number of patent applications.1 5 0 Therefore, it is necessary for courts to adopt a
standard by which the enforceability of delayed or submarine patents will be
151
judged.

IV. PROPOSAL

This Comment proposes that courts continue to recognize the defense of
prosecution laches, and that they adopt a test comprised of factors to further a
consistent and reliable application of the laches doctrine to patent cases. 152 As stated
above, the laches defense requires that the delay must be unreasonable and that the
delay was detrimental to the opposing party. 153 This defense shall only apply to
patents applied for before the 1995 change in the patent term from seventeen years
after the date of issuance to twenty years after the date of filing. 15 4 Because any
unreasonable delay before this change in the law allowed a patent holder to have a
lengthened window of validity, such a delay would undoubtedly be detrimental to a
party that is a defendant in an infringement claim based on a patent that would
otherwise have already expired. 155 Therefore, the key issue of contention will be
156
whether the delay was unreasonable.
In determining whether a prosecution delay was unreasonable for a laches
defense, this Comment proposes that the court consider the following factors:
i) Whether a significant portion of the delay was caused by the applicant for
reasons other than incapacity;
2)

Whether the delay was longer than two years; and

3) Whether the applicant amended his claims to include products that were
independently brought to market during the delay.

§154(b), while applications filed after May 29, 2000 are eligible for patent term adjustment under
the new 35 U.S.C. §154(b)).
150

THOMAS

E.

ANDERSON,

SOFTWARE

PATENT

INSTITUTE

DATABASE

OF

SOFTWARE

TECHNOLOGIES, CHANGES IN U.S. PATENT LAWS AS A RESULT OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

GATT

AND NAFTA AGREEMENTS, at http://www.spi.org/gatt.htm (last visited on Nov. 3, 2001).
1,5 Crilly, supra note 146.
152 Soo Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 277 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding
that the laches defense should be applied with respect to patent prosecution and that the legislative
history does not show any indication of intent to remove the defense). Judge Pauline Newman wrote
a dissent in this case, arguing that the rules for continuing application have been long established
and were codified in the 1952 Patent Act. -d. at 1368-69.
1 3 See Conopco, Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 95 F.3d 187, 192 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (emphasizing the
importance of the public good when considering laches).
5,4 Crilly, supra note 146.
155 Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association, et al., Symbol Techs., Inc.
v. Lemelson Med., 243 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (No. 00-1583).
1, Crilly, supra note 146.
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The first factor, that a significant portion of the delay was caused by the
applicant for reasons other than incapacity, allows for incapacity to be used as a
legitimate justification for delay. 157 It also does not punish the applicant for delays
158
that were beyond his control, such as those caused by the PTO.
The second factor, that the delay be longer than two years, allows for legitimate
delays caused by the applicant. Two years will allow inventors to complete further
research and amend their claims. 159 However, an unexplained delay of longer than
two years will constitute grounds for a finding of unreasonableness. 160 This time
factor is supported by the Supreme Court decision in Webster v. Splitdorf in which
the Court dismissed an infringement suit brought by Webster.1 61 The suit was based
on two claims that were amended two years after the plaintiffs divisional
application. 162

The third factor that a court should consider is whether the applicant has
amended his claims to specifically include products that were brought to market
during the delay. This is a secondary factor and would not necessarily have to be
present for a court to apply prosecution laches. The goal of this factor is to severely
limit the practice of patent applicants monitoring recent developments and amending
their claims to reflect those developments. 163 Patent applicants should not be
allowed to gain the benefit of having learned from products that were developed by

157A.C. Aukerman Co.v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
158

See id. (listing the court listed multiple reasons that could create an equitable justification

for delay and also held that a court should consider any justification offered by the plaintiff).
1,9Crilly, supra note 146.
160 See Webster Elec. Co. v. Splitdorf Elec. Co., 264 U.S. 463, 465 (1924) (barring the patent
holder's claims based on prosecution laches and stating that an unexplained two-year delay
constitutes prima facie evidence of unreasonableness). Weboster involved a plaintiff who amended
claims two years after a divisional application and eight years after the initial disclosures on which
the priority of the patent was based. Id.
161Id. at 465. The Supreme Court reasoned that the interests of the inventor must be balanced
against the interests of the public. Id.
We do not overlook the importance of not applying so narrowly the patent
law as to discourage the inventor from exercising his creative genius, or the
manufacturer or capitalist from assisting in the necessary work of bringing the
invention into beneficial use; but it is no less important that the law shall not be
so loosely construed and enforced as to subvert its limitations, and bring about an
undue extension of the patent monopoly against private and public rights. In
suits to enforce reissue patents, the settled rule of this court is that a delay for
two years or more will 'invalidate the reissue, unless the delay is accounted for
and excused by special circumstances, which show it to have been not
unreasonable.
Id. at 466.
162Id.
163Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson, No. CV-N-92-613-LDG(PHA), 1995 WL 628330, at *13 (D. Nev.
June 16, 1995). Lemelson argued that this practice is a fair use of the patent system. Id. However,
the Supreme Court spoke unfavorably of this practice in Webster. Webster, 264 U.S. at 465. In that
case, Webster had amended his claims to include nine claims of a recently issued patent for the
purpose of creating a cause for an interference action. Id. at 464. He further added two more
claims, which read on recent developments that were in public use. Id. In holding the two latest
claim unenforceable, the Supreme Court characterized the plaintiffs actions as unfair. Id. at 465.
"[The plaintiff], so far as claims seven and eight are concerned, simply stood by and awaited
developments." Id. (emphasis added.)
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other entities during a delay. 164 It is unfair for an applicant to be allowed to take
advantage of such learnings by amending claims to read on products that, if not for
the delay, would not have been covered. 165 Additionally, it would also be unfair for
other entities to be removed of the right to practice an invention several years after
the fact, where they have lawfully, and perhaps at great expense, adopted such
practices before such practices have been protected by a patent.166

V. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the requirements proposed in this Comment would be met only by
very few patents. 167 Such patents would likely be those that represent a highly
inequitable attempt to exploit a loophole that existed in patent prosecution rules.
While nearly all applicants wish to have their patents issued as soon as possible, the
possibility that an applicant would decide that his patent would be of greater value
much further in the future and attempt to extend his window through unreasonable
delays still existed prior to the change of rules in 1995.168 Such an issue admittedly
applies to a very small number of patents. However, as the Lemelson issue shows,
169
such patents can be of enormous financial consequence.
It is therefore important that courts adopt a clear policy toward the treatment of
submarine patents. Such a policy will ensure that companies and individuals who
170
invest in intellectual property are not unjustly burdened by submarine patents.
Such a policy will also ensure that patent laws are not changed in such a way that
171
will weaken the protection afforded to small inventors of revolutionary products.
164Id.

165Id.

166See Parks v. Booth, 102 U.S. 96, 105 (1880) (reasoning that if inventors do not keep their
inventions secret, they are required to be vigilant in obtaining a patent for their protection).
Inventors may, if they can, keep their invention secret; and if they do for any
length of time, they do not forfeit their right to apply for a patent, unless another
in the meantime has made the invention, and secured by patent the exclusive
right to make, use, and vend the patented improvement. Within that rule and
subject to that condition, inventors may delay to apply for a patent.
Bates v. Coe, 98 U. S. 31, 46 (1878).
167 Crilly, supra note 146. In proposing a solution to the submarine patent issue, it is
important to note that the situation presented by Lemelson's multiple continuances is rare. Id.
Over the past twenty-two years, of the 627 potential submarine patents that have been created,
sixty-seven percent of the delays were caused by PTO-issued secrecy orders that prevented the
patents from issuing. Id. Another six percent were delayed for other reasons not caused by the
applicant. This leaves a remaining 167 potentially submarine patents, which were delayed for
unexplained reasons. These 167 potentially submarine patents constitute less than one-hundredth
of one percent of the 2.3 million patents that have issued over the time period. Id.
168 Id.

169 Varchaver, supranote 2. Lemelson has collected over $1.5 billion in licensing fees as of May
2001. Id.
170 Crilly, supra note 146. It is also important that any proposal to handle the few submarine
patents that issue does not weaken the patent system, a system that has provided the protection
necessary for corporations and individuals to create countless jobs and numerous new industries.

Id.
171Id. The term of patents issued after the 1995 change are measured in relation to the date of
application, as opposed to the date of issuance. Id. The defense of laches will not be applicable to
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By limiting the threat of submarine patents, such a policy will further the goals of
the excellent U.S. patent system.

patents that issue under the new law, since a delay in prosecution will no longer extend the reach of
the patent term. Td.

